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SEAMAN'S DIRECT BUYING SERVICE, INC. 
v. STANDARD OIL CO.: SCALING THE 
STONEWALL TORT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A contract consists of promises to do or not to do some-
thing, thereby creating contractual obligations. l Failure to per-
form one's promise under a contract constitutes a breach of a 
contractual obligation.2 A party injured by another's acts or 
omissions may recover compensation, usually money, which is 
called damages. 3 
Breach of a contractual obligation avails the aggrieved party 
of the contract remedy of suing in an action for damages proxi-
mately caused by or the likely result of the breach.4 These com-
pensatory damages are measured in the amount necessary to put 
the aggrieved party in as good a position as if the other party 
had fully performed. Ii Contract liability therefore is predicated 
on the premise that only promises in terms specifically agreed 
upon and voluntarily given result in duties or obligations which 
may be breached.6 
Traditionally, the motive underlying the behavior of the 
breaching party is not considered in the implementation of the 
contract remedy, no matter how egregious the breach.7 Where 
breach of a contract is accompanied by malicious or willful and 
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1549 (West 1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 
(1981). 
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 170-
71 (5th ed. 1979). 
3. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3281 (West 1970). 
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300 (West 1970). 
5. Id.; CAL. CIV. CODE § 3358 (West Supp. 1987); CAL. COM. CODE § 1106(1) (West 
1964). See also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.16, at 890 (1982). 
6. Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom 
of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REV. 401, 409 (1964). 
7. CAL. COM. CODE § 1106(1) (West 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
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wanton conduct giving the aggrieved party an action in tort, ex-
emplary damages may be available in addition to compensatory 
damages.8 The breaching party found guilty of oppression, fraud 
or malice will be liable in tort as a punishment and as a deter-
rence to others from engaging in similar conduct.9 Thus, such 
damages are also known as punitive damages. lo 
A covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every 
contract governed by California law. ll California courts have rec-
ognized this implied covenant since 1942.12 The covenant re-
quires each party to a contract to insure that its acts and omis-
sions do not prevent the other parties from receiving their 
benefits under the contract. IS Parties injured by a breach of the 
covenant are entitled to contract remedies, that is, the compen-
satory damages provided by law or that the parties have negoti-
ated and expressed in their contracts.14 However, they may also 
be entitled to tort remedies and the recovery of punitive dam-
ages with respect to insurance Iii and employment contractsl6 
and, in narrow circumstances, commercial contracts. 17 
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1987). 
9. [d. See also J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. THE LAW O~' CONTRACTS § 14-3, at 520 (2d 
ed. 1977). 
10. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1987). See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK 
ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 275-78 (1935). 
11. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818, 620 P.2d 141, 145, 169 
Cal. Rptr. 691, 695 (1979); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 573, 510 P.2d 1032, 
1036, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 484 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 
P.2d 173, 176,58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 
2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958); Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d .559, 564, 212 
P.2d 878, 881 (1949); Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 
771, 128 P.2d 665, 677 (1942). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 
(1981); 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW. CONTRACTS § 576 (8th ed. 1973 & 
Supp. 1984). 
12. Universal Sales Corp., 20 Cal. 2d at 771, 128 P.2d at 677. 
13. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 818, 620 P.2d at 145, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 695; Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d 
at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16; Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at 658,328 P.2d at 200; 
Brown, 34 Cal. 2d at 564, 212 P.2d at 881; Universal Sales Corp., 20 Cal. 2d at 771, 128 
P.2d at 677. 
14. Brown, 34 Cal. 2d at 564, 212 P.2d at 881 (1949) (agreements to make mut.ual 
wills); Osborne v. Cal-Am Fin. Corp., 80 Cal. App. 3d 259, 266, 145 Cal. Rptr. 584, 589 
(1978) (agreements to sell real property); Masonite Corp. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 65 
Cal. App. 3d 1, 9, 135 Cal. Rptr. 170, 175 (1976) (contracts to provide utility services); 
Foley v. U.S. Paving Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 499, 505, 68 Cal. Rptr. 780, 784 (1968) (em-
ployee incentive contracts). 
15. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. 
17. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768-769, 
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Breaches of insurance contracts may result in contract lia-
bility and tort liability for bad faith breach of contract. IS Insur-
ance contracts are based on a "special relationship," that of in-
surer and insured, involving the elements of adhesion, fiduciary 
responsibility and public interest. IS Therefore, insurers which 
breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may 
be directed to pay their insureds punitive as well as compensa-
tory damages. 2o 
The relationships among parties in banking2I and employ-
ment contracts22 have been viewed as having some of the special 
relationship characteristics in common with insurance contracts. 
Yet most California courts have been unwilling to impose tort 
sanctions for breach of the implied covenant in banking and em-
ployment contracts. In Tameny u. Atlantic Richfield CO.,23 the 
landmark case concerning wrongful discharge from employment, 
the California Supreme Court established a cause of action in tort 
for wrongful termination, but not for bad faith breach of contract.24 
686 P.2d 1158. 1166. 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (1984). 
18. See e.g .• Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 432, 426 P.2d 173, 178,58 
Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (1967) (insurer failed to meet the duty to accept a reasonable settle-
ment within the policy limits); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 663, 
328 P.2d 198, 203 (1958) (insurer wrongfully declined to defend its insured and refused 
to accept a reasonable settlement within the policy limits). 
19. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co .• 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 620 P.2d 141, 146, 169 
Cal. Rptr. 691, 696 (1979). 
20. See supra note 18. 
21. See generally Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27,34, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520 
(1980) (assuming that bad faith cause of action may arise from a borrower-lender rela-
tionship); Sawyer v. Bank of Am., 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 141, 145 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627 
(1978) (Rattigan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The ban~'s implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing separately obligated it, by operation of law, as an 
incident of the oral contract pleaded and proved.") (emphasis in original). 
22. See generally Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 322, 171 Cal. 
Rptr. 917. 922 (1981) (employee terminated after 32 years contended that his discharge 
by his employer violated fundamental principles of public policy); Wallis v. Superior 
Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1116-19, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 127-30 (1984) (employee's 
written agreement with employer for termination payments in return for employee's cov-
enant not to compete could be tortiously breached due to similar characteristics to those 
found in insurance contracts). 
23. 27 Cal. 3d. 167. 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). 
24. In Tameny, the court declined to determine whether or not there was a tort 
action for the breach of the implied covenant, although it acknowledged the line of insur-
ance contract cases which imposed tort as well as contract remedies: 
We do note in this regard, however, that authorities in other 
jurisdictions have on occasion found an employer's discharge 
3
Kim: Contract Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987
282 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:279 
Only the California Court of Appeal has ventured outside the 
insurance contract boundary.211 
In Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil 
CO.,26 the California Supreme Court affirmed its position that an 
insurance carrier may risk tort liability for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in addition to contract 
damages. 27 Moreover, Seaman's enabled the court to explore 
such liability in the context of an ordinary commercial contract 
in which "parties of roughly equal bargaining power are free to 
shape the contours of their agreement."28 The Seaman's major-
ity deemed it unnecessary to find tort liability on the breach of 
the implied covenant issue.29 Instead the court created a more 
limited area of tort liability - the so-called tort of "stone-
walling" - in which the breaching party denies, in bad faith 
and without probable cause, the existence of a contract to shield 
itself from liability.30 
This narrowly defined tort may well have ramifications on 
freedom of contract and affect the future of commercial contract 
negotiation.31 The essence of freedom of contract lies in the 
of an at-will employee violative of the employer's 'good faith 
and fair dealing' obligations and past California cases have 
held that a breach of this implied-at-law covenant sounds in 
tort as well as in contract. 
Id. at 179 n.12, 610 P.2d at 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846 n.12. 
25. Cleary v. Amer.ican Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d. 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 
(1980) (employer held liable for the tort of bad faith breach of contract for wrongful 
termination of employment). Accord Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 
163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985) (defendant bank's negligence was deemed 
to be a breach of the bank's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in 
the contractual relationship with its depositor). See al.wl Louderback & Jurika, Stan-
dards for Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 187 
(1982) which characterized Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc. as "the only California case 
clearly holding that a plaintiff had stated a cause of action for the tort of bad faith 
breach of contract outside the insurance field." Id. at 212 and as "the only case ex-
tending the tort beyond an insurance contract .... " Id. at 215. 
26. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). 
27. Id. at 768, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362. 
28. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. See also Traynor, Bad Faith Breach of a Commercial Contract: A Comment 
on the Seaman's Case, 8 Bus. L. NEWS 1, 11 n.28 (1984) ("[T]he court in Seaman's 
recognized a new tort of 'stonewalling' .... "). 
31. See generally, Traynor, supra note 30, at 11-14; Comment, Reconstructing 
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dcaling as a Tort, 73 CAW'. L .. 
REV. 1291, 1299-1331 (1985); Comment, Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Stan-
dard Oil Co.: Tortious Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in a 
4
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parties assuming responsibility for making enforceable con-
tracts. 32 This freedom also permits the parties to breach their 
contracts, resulting in liability to the other party for compensa-
tory damages.33 Parties in an ordinary commercial contract who 
have mutually agreed on their obligations and expectations sub-
ject to specified covenants, conditions and remedies may not 
look favorably upon the imposition of tort liability for breach of 
contract in addition to traditional contract damages. 
II. SEAMAN'S DIRECT BUYING SERVICE, INC. v. STAN-
DARD OIL CO. 
A. FACTS34 
Plaintiff, Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. ("Sea-
man's"), a dealer in ship supplies and equipment, occupied 
space in an old waterfront area in the City of Eureka ("City"). 
In 1970, the City decided to condemn the area as part of a rede-
velopment plan to create a modern marina. Seaman's regarded 
this as an opportunity to expand and update its operations. It 
approached the City with a proposal to lease a large portion of 
the new marina, some of the area for its own operations and the 
remainder to be profitably sublet. The City agreed initially to 
the lease of a smaller area. It would permit renegotiation for the 
additional space if Seaman's could provide evidence of financial 
responsibility in the form of a binding agreement with an oil 
supplier. 
After negotiating with a number of oil companies, Seaman's 
reached a satisfactory agreement with the defendant, Standard 
Oil Co. of California ("Standard"). In October of 1972, Standard 
presented a letter outlining the terms of the agreement, in re-
sponse to Seaman's repeated requests for written evidence of a 
Noninsurance Commercial Contract Case, 71 IOWA L. REV. 893, 898-9U (1986); Com-
ment, Sailing the Uncharted Seas of Bad Faith: Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. 
v. Standard Oil Co., 69 MINN L. REV. U61, 1176-86 (1985); Note, "Contort": Tortious 
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsurance, 
Commercial Contracts-Its Existence and Desirability, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 510, 
522-27 (1985); Comment, Bad Faith Revisited: An Examination of Tort [LJaw Remedies 
for Commercial Contract Disputes, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 315, 330-35 (1985). 
32. Kessler & Fine, supra note 6, at 409. 
33. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 49, at 88-90 (2d ed. 1977). 
34. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 759-62, 686 P.2d at 1160-62, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356-58. 
5
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binding commitment. The letter was executed by both parties. It 
contemplated (1) Standard and Seaman's entering into a Chev-
ron Marine Dealer agreement .for an initial term of 10 years, (2) 
Standard providing Seaman's with financing for its facilities, (3) 
Standard discounting costs to Seaman's for fuel and (4) Stan-
dard having the right to cure in case of Seaman's default of its 
obligations to the City.311 Seaman's was then able to finalize its 
lease with the City for the additional marina property. 
The Arab oil embargo and the resultant nationwide fuel 
shortage erupted within the following months. Standard then in-
stituted a "no new business" policy. During 1973, Standard ar-
ranged for a temporary marine dealership agreement to supply 
Seaman's with fuel during the construction of the new marina, 
but the Chevron Marine Dealer agreement as proposed in the 
1972 commitment letter was not executed. 
In November of 1973, Standard advised Seaman's that it 
could not proceed with the proposed financing and supplying ar-
rangement. The Federal Government had mandated a petroleum 
products allocation for oil suppliers' existing customers. In the 
communications that followed, Standard claimed that Seaman's 
was not an existing customer and that only the federal mandate 
was preventing it from proceeding with the contract. 
Seaman's applied for an exemption from the Federal Gov-
ernment. The application process was expedited as Standard 
even cooperated by assisting Seaman's with the necessary docu-
mentation.36 In February of 1974, Seaman's efforts were re-
35. The letter concluded by stating: 
[T)his offer is subject to our mutual agreement on the specific 
wording of contracts to be drawn, endorsement and/or ap-
proval by governmental offices involved, and continued ap-
proval of Seaman's credit status at the time the agreements 
are to go into effect. If this approach and proposal meets with 
your approval, we would appreciate your acknowledgment and 
acceptance of these terms by signing and returning two copies 
of this letter. We can proceed further with the drafting of the 
final agreements .... 
[d. at 760, 686 P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (quoting the letter of October 11, 
1972). 
36. Standard supplied Seaman's with the necessary documentation to request an 
exemption from the Federal Energy Office and even "helped fill [the forms) out." [d. at 
761, 686 P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357. 
6
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warded with a supply order from the Federal Energy Office.37 
Standard then changed its position by asserting that there never 
had been a binding agreement.38 It appealed the order and re-
ceived a reversal in its favor. 39 Seaman's then appealed and a 
reversal was granted on the condition that a court order validate 
the existence of a contract between the parties under state law. '0 
When Seaman's requested Standard to stipulate to the exis-
tence of the contract, Standard refused, despite Seaman's expla-
nation that it could not afford to go to trial.'l In early 1975, Sea-
man's was forced to discontinue its operations. It filed suit 
against Standard, charging breach of contract, fraud, breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and interfer-
ence with Seaman's contractual relations with the city.42 The 
jury awarded compensatory damages for the breach of contract, 
and compensatory and punitive damages for both the tortious 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
and for the intentional tort of interference with contractual rela-
tions.'3 Seaman's consented to a reduction in the punitive dam-
ages to counter the conditional granting of Standard's motion 
for a new trial. Standard appealed from the judgment and Sea-
man's cross-appealed from the remittitur of punitive damages. 
B. THE DECISION OF THE COURT 
The court confronted three issues: (1) whether the commit-
ment letter complied with the statute of frauds,'4 (2) whether 
the intent necessary to sustain the cause of action for intentional 
interference with contractual relations had been proven satisfac-





41. Standard's representative was portrayed as unsympathetic and unresponsive to 
Seaman's plight: "In reply, Standard's representative laughed and said, 'See you in 
court.' " [d. at 762, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358. Later, this statement would 
be construed by the court in its analysis as the "stonewall" position. See infra note 91 
and accompanying text. 
42. Seaman's 36 Cal. 3d at 762, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358. At trial, 
Seaman's prevailed on all but the fraud cause of action. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. 
45. [d. at 765, 686 P.2d at 1164, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 360. 
7
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breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
a commercial contract.46 
The court determined that the commitment letter executed 
by Standard and Seaman's contained all the essential terms of 
their agreement, stated the requisite quantity term and there-
fore constituted a contract.47 As a contract, the letter satisfied 
the statute of frauds requirements under both California Civil 
Code section 162448 and California Uniform Commercial Code 
section 2-201 (sale of goods).49 To comply with those require-
ments, an agreement, which is not to be performed within a year 
from the making thereof, must be in writing, must be signed by 
the party to be charged and must specify a quantity term. Ac-
cordingly, the judgment in Seaman's favor for breach of contract 
was affirmed. lio 
The judgment for Seaman's on the intentional interference 
cause of action was reversed and remanded due to prejudicial 
error in the jury instructions. iii The judge instructed the jury 
that it could find intentional interference by Standard if Stan-
dard knew disruption of Seaman's contract with the City was 
"substantially certain" to occur.1i2 The jury was not instructed 
that Standard must have intended to cause Seaman's breach of 
its contract with the City.1i3 In the court's view, there was not 
46. [d. at 767, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362. 
47. [d. at 762-65, 686 P.2d at 1162-64, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358-60. 
48. [d. at 763, 686 P.2d at 1163, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 359. That section reads in part: 
"The following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, 
are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party's agent: (a) An 
agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making 
thereof." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(a) (West Supp. 1987). 
49. [d. at 764-65, 686 P.2d at 1163-64, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60. That section reads 
in part: 
[AJ contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more 
is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is 
some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has 
been made between the parties and signed by the party 
against whom enforcement is sought .... A writing is not in-
sufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed 
upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph 
beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing. 
CAL. COM. CODE § 2201(1) (West 1964). 
50. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 774, 686 P.2d at 1170, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 366. 
51. [d. at 767, 686 P.2d at 1165-66, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62. 
52. [d. at 767, 686 P.2d at 1165, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 361. 
53. [d. 
8
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sufficient evidence that Standard acted with the purpose or de-
sign primarily to interfere with Seaman's formation of a pro-
spective economic relationship with the City.54 Seaman's breach 
with the City was only "an incidental, if foreseeable, conse-
quence of Standard's action." As Seaman's had failed to carry 
its burden of proof concerning Standard's intent, the cause was 
remanded for jury instructions on inferring culpable intent. 55 
The court unequivocally regarded the issue of breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as the principal 
one. 58 The facts of Seaman's did not mandate a finding of such a 
breach, although Standard's liability could have been predicated 
on other grounds. For example, Seaman's could have asserted 
promissory liability against Standard by stressing foreseeability 
and substantiality of reliance. Standard would be estopped to 
deny the contract's existence. 57 Or, in the alternative, Standard's 
denial of the contract's existence and its refusal to stipulate to 
its existence might have been held to be anticipatory repudia-
tion.58 Instead, the court preferred to carve out a more limited 
area of tort liability subsumed under the existing tortious breach 
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Where a breaching 
party seeks to shield itself from liability by denying the exis-
tence of a contract, and the denial is made in bad faith and 
without probable cause, it may give rise to an action in tort. 59 A 
denial based on a reasonable belief which is undertaken in good 
faith does not support a cause of action in tort.80 
At trial there had been a considerable amount of conflicting 
54.Id. 
55. [d. at 767, 686 P.2d at 1165-66, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62. 
56. Id. at 767, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362. 
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981). See also Kessler & Fine, 
supra note 6, at 424. 
58. Taylor v. Johnston, 15 Cal. 3d 130, 137, 539 P.2d 425, 430, 123 Cal. Rptr. 641, 
646 (1975). See also Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 784, 686 P.2d at 1177, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 367 
where Chief Justice Bird asserted: "Standard's denial of the existence of the contract to 
the federal agency and the subsequent refusal to stipulate were anticipatory breaches." 
Id. 
59. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. 
60. Id. at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. 
9
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evidence on the bad faith issue.61 The jury instructions62 did not 
address the requirement for a finding of bad faith.63 The court 
was concerned that the jury may have imposed liability without 
deciding whether or not Standard had acted in bad faith. 64 It 
reversed the judgment for Seaman's. The claim for breach of the 
implied covenant was remanded to the lower court with instruc-
tions to include jury instructions in accordance with the 
opinion.611 
C. CHIEF JUSTICE BIRD'S OPINION 
Chief Justice Bird concurred with the majority on the issues 
of the breach of contract and intentional interference with con-
tractual relations, but dissented on the issue of the implied cove-
nant in a separate opinion.66 She criticized the majority's reluc-
tance to include the narrowly defined bad faith denial of 
contract tort within the existing tortious breach of the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing.67 
In Chief Justice Bird's view, since the duty to act fairly and 
in good faith is inherent in every contract, "under certain cir-
cumstances, a breach of contract may support a tort cause of 
action for breach of implied covenant."6S The nature and extent 
of the duty is dictated by the parties' expectations and the con-
61. [d. at 771, 686 P.2d at 1168, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 364. 
62. The jury instructions read, in part: "[W]here a binding contract [has] been 
agreed upon, the law implies a covenant that neither party will deny the existence of a 
contract, since doing so violates the legal prohibition against doing anything to prevent 
realization of the promises of the performance of the contract." [d. at 770, 686 P.2d at 
1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. 




67. A contracting party should not be able to deny the existence 
of a valid contract in order to shield itself from liability for 
breach of that contract. Today, the court holds that an action 
will lie in tort against such conduct. However, it refuses to ac-
knowledge that its holding is compelled by this court's past 
decisions analyzing the scope of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. This court should not continue to re-
treat from its own decisional authority in this area. 
Id. at 774-75, 686 P.2d at 1171, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (Bird, C.J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
68. [d. at 775, 686 P.2d at 1171, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 367. 
10
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tract's purpose.S9 Citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.70 and 
subsequent California Court of Appeal cases,71 she traced the 
development of imposition of tort liability for breach of the im-
plied covenant to contracts outside of the insurance arena.72 
The chief justice considered both parties' conduct in Sea-
man's and observed that "it would be reasonable to conclude 
that the parties' justified expectations did not include the possi-
bility of a breach."73 She viewed Standard's breach of the con-
tract as a violation of the duty to deal fairly and in good faith 
and opined that an independent finding of bad faith should not 
be required.74 In her view, the judgment for'Seaman's on the 
breach of the implied covenant should have been affirmed.711 
III. "STONEWALLING" - THE NEW TORT FOR DENIAL 
IN BAD FAITH IN COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 
In Seaman's, the California Supreme Court affirmed that 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
an insurance contract gives rise to tort remedies because of the 
special relationship between the parties.7s The majority ac-
knowledged that tort remedies may also arise in noninsurance 
contracts, where elements of the special relationship between 
the parties are present and the implied covenant is breached.77 
The Seaman's majority, however, was reluctant to find tort 
liability in so broad an area as commercial contracts.7S This re-
69. [d. at 777, 686 P.2d at 1172, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 368. 
70. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). See supra notes 23-24 
and accompanying text. 
71. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 
(1980); Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980). 
72. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 776, 686 P.2d at 1171, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 367. 
73. [d. at 781, 686 P.2d at 1175, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 371. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. at 784, 686 P.2d at 1177, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 373. 
76. See supra note 19. 
77. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 768-69, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362. 
78. When we move from such special relationships to considera-
tion of the tort remedy in the context of the ordinary commer-
cial contract, we move into largely uncharted and potentially 
dangerous waters .... In such contracts, it may be difficult to 
distinguish between breach of the covenant and breach of con-
tract, and there is the risk that interjecting tort remedies will 
intrude upon the expectations of the parties. 
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luctance may have been based on the inapplicability of the spe-
cial relationship standard. A relationship between the parties to 
an ordinary commercial (non insurance) contract cannot gener-
ally be said to have the characteristics of one found between 
parties to insurance contracts: 
1) Parties to commercial contracts are presumed to have en-
tered into a consensual relationship. Each is contracting for the 
benefit of the bargain. Since the legal rights or liabilities of the 
public generally are not affected, the public interest element is 
not present.7S 
2) Parties to commercial contracts have the freedom to 
draft their provisions and to negotiate them to their mutual sat-
isfaction. They may provide specific remedies in the event of 
breach of the contract in accordance with their understanding. It 
would be very rare indeed for such an agreement to take the 
form of a standardized "take it or leave it" contract which is the 
basis for the adhesion element. so 
3) Parties to commercial contracts generally have equal bar-
gaining power. Each is presumably acting in its own best inter-
ests. One party is not held to a higher standard of conduct with 
respect to the other because the relationship is not one where 
either is acting primarily for the other's benefit or interests. A 
commercial contract therefore lacks the fiduciary responsibility 
element.sl 
The majority was constrained to create a new tort cause of 
action in the event that a party not only breaches the contract, 
but denies in bad faith and without probable cause the con-
tract's existence, to shield itself from liability. Thus the stone-
[d. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63. 
79. Aside from its incidental public benefit, the contemplated contract in Seaman's 
would have had no effect on the community at large. id. at 759-60, 686 P.2d at 1160-61, 
206 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57. 
80. Although the language used in the Seaman's commitment letter may have been 
customary in Standard Oil's business practices, both sides participated in the pre-com-
mitment letter negotiations. [d. at 760, 686 P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357. 
81. In Seaman's, both parties were considered sophisticated in business transac-
tions. The fact that Seaman's was a small entity (close corporation consisting of three 
shareholders) in relation to Standard was not significant, since it had dealt previously 
with another large oil supplier, Mobil Oil Company. [d. at 759, 686 P.2d at 1160, 206 Cal. 
Rptr. at 356. 
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wall tort emanated from the court's analysis which was limited 
to the Seaman's facts. B2 
The majority applied principles enunciated in Adams u. 
Crater Well Drilling, Inc.,B3 an Oregon Supreme Court tort case, 
to develop this new area of tort.B4 In that case, the plaintiff 
("Adams") brought suit against the drilling company for an 
overcharge for services. The defendant had "threatened to bring 
action against [the] plaintiff" even though the defendant "knew 
that the amount claimed exceeded the amount plaintiff owed for 
the work done."B5 The defendant's purpose was viewed by the 
Oregon court as plainly coercive.B6 The court found Adams's 
payment was made under protest and in response to the defend-
ant drilling company's threat of civil proceedings. B7 The jury as-
sessed punitive damages on finding bad faith in the defendant's 
threat.BB On the basis of the jury's finding that the defendant's 
threat was made "without probable cause and with no belief in 
the existence of the cause of action,"B9 the Oregon Supreme 
Court characterized the defendant drilling company as "a 
wrongdoer in a tortious sense. "90 
The majority in Seaman's analogized in principle the be-
havior of the defendant in Adams to that of "a contracting party 
seeking to avoid all liability on a meritorious contract claim by 
adopting a 'stonewall' position ('see you in court') without prob-
able cause and with no belief in the existence of a defense. "91 
Imposition of tort liability and assessment of punitive damages 
were appropriate under the Adams circumstances because the 
breach of the implied covenant was readily distinguishable from 
the mere breach of the contract.92 The significance of this dis-
82. Id. at 769-70, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. 
83. 276 Or. 789, 556 P.2d 679 (1976). 
84. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. 




89. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 71 (1937)). 
90.Id. 
91. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769-70, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. The 
majority expressed its disapproval of these practices in its subsequent comments: "Such 
conduct goes beyond the mere breach of contract. It offends accepted notions of business 
ethics." (citing Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635 (1976)). 
92. Adams, 276 Or. at 791-92, 556 P.2d at 681-82. See also Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 
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tinction justified applying tort remedies in addition to awarding 
compensatory damages.93 
The majority sought to distinguish the circumstances lead-
ing to the creation of the stonewall tort in Adams from those in 
Seaman's. In Seaman's, Standard contended that no binding 
agreement had ever been reached.94 Because the jury instruc-
tions on the breach of the implied covenant did not mention bad 
faith, the jury may have held Standard liable simply because of 
its denial of a valid contract, without regard to a conclusive find-
ing of bad faith. 911 Moreover, the jury was not advised that if 
Standard had believed in good faith no contract existed, it did 
have the right to refuse to stipulate to the evidence of a contract 
and to force Seaman's into litigation.96 In the majority's view, 
Standard's behavior was not clearly enough defined to be tor-
tious, if the denial of the existence of a binding contract had 
been made in good faith. 97 Consequently, the Seaman's court 
was not willing to find Standard liable in tort for breach of the 
implied covenant, especially under a commercial contract.98 
This unwillingness was, perhaps, tacit acknowledgment by 
the court that, under commercial contracts between parties of 
equal bargaining power, the parties should realize there is al-
ways the risk that one party will breach should it become eco-
nomically advantageous to do so. Moreover, great deference has 
always been given to the principle of freedom of contract. Giving 
parties the freedom to deal at arm's length and to self-regulate 
their contracts means giving them the freedom to breach as well. 
Broad application of tort remedies in this area would nullify 
those freedoms by allowing an injured party to recover not only 
compensatory damages but also to punish the breaching party 
by recovering punitive damages. 
770, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. 
93. The majority further observed: "Acceptance of tort remedies in such a situation 
is not likely to intrude upon the bargaining relationship or upset reasonable expectations 
of the contracting parties." Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. 
at 363. 
94. [d. at 761, 686 P.2d at 1161·62, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357·58. 
95. [d. at 774, 686 P.2d at 1170, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 366. 
96. [d. at 771, 686 P.2d at 1168, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 364. 
97. [d. at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. 
98. [d. at 774, 686 P.2d at 1170, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 366. 
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IV. THE NEW TORT'S RAMIFICATIONS 
A. ON NEGOTIATION 
293 
The California Supreme Court's analysis of the concept of 
breach of the implied covenant in a commercial contract and its 
conclusion that there must be an independent finding of bad 
faith for a tort remedy is persuasive. Chief Justice Bird's exami-
nation of Standard's acts,99 and her dissenting view that no in-
dependent showing of bad faith should be required,loo suggest an 
area of tort liability unrestrained by the nature of the contract. 
The majority was disinclined to extend the limits of its newly 
created tort that far. Nevertheless, the court's willingness to 
consider the imposition of tort remedies for breach of the im-
plied covenant in a commercial contract must be regarded with 
circumspection. 
The court's affirmation that there was a binding contract fo-
cused on the parties' respective situations and exigencies as evi-
denced by the terms of the commitment letter.101 Seaman's 
claimed that Standard's breach of the letter's terms was not only 
a breach of contract but also a breach of the implied covenant 
enabling it to recover in tort. 102 Standard asserted that it had 
never viewed the commitment letter as a binding contract.103 
The implication was that it intended to subsequently negotiate 
and possibly enter into a more definitive agreement. This is a 
not uncommon practice in commercial transactions. 
Although the court analyzed the commitment letter and de-
termined it satisfied the statute of frauds under California Civil 
and Uniform Commercial Codes;04 it failed to focus on the let-
ter's apparent contemplation of a future agreement. This failure 
may have stemmed from the inherent ambiguity of how the par-
99. After being ordered by the Federal Energy Office to supply fuel to Seaman's, 
Standard denied the existence of a binding contract and attempted to counteract Sea-
man's endeavors to obtain an exemption from the new federal regulations. Id. at 781-82, 
686 P.2d at 1175-76, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 371-72. 
100. Id. at 781, 686 P.2d at 1175, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 371. 
101. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. 
102. See supra note 46. 
103. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 771, 686 P.2d at 1168, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 364. 
104. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
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ties perceived the letter's role in the formation of the desired 
contract. 
Providing the written letter evidencing Seaman's binding 
commitment with an oil supplier was the prerequisite which led 
to the City's approval for leasing the larger area to Seaman's. 
Standard cooperated with Seaman's requests by writing the let-
ter. Seaman's reasonably assumed that the commitment letter 
was the definitive agreement in the interim, one on which it 
could rely until the Chevron Dealer Agreement was executed. 
That agreement was to be the formal memorialization of the 
parties' financing and supplying arrangement. 
The concluding language of the letterlOIi seemed to indicate 
both parties were anticipating further negotiation before finaliz-
ing their agreement. Standard may have perceived the commit-
ment letter as an intermediate step not necessarily binding on 
either itself or Seaman's, despite its "binding terms" language. lo6 
In light of Seaman's, parties who require commitment letters 
during the negotiation of commercial contracts should draft 
them if possible without any ambiguities. Careful consideration 
should be given to attempts to modify or deny the existence of 
terms to prevent such attempts from being construed as dealings 
in bad faith. The limited holding of Seaman's emphasizes that 
commitment letters are binding and enforceable contracts, not-
withstanding the parties' intents, such as Seaman's belief that 
the letter was merely an agreement to agree. Parties to commit-
ment letters or contracts are free to breach. However, should 
they deny the existence of a contract in bad faith and without 
probable cause they may be liable to the other party for punitive 
damages as well. Parties taking a more conservative approach 
may be unwilling to initiate pre-commitment negotiations with-
out the utmost certainty of contract consummation. 
B. ON COMMERCIAL BUSINESS PRACTICES 
Under good faith and fair dealing principles, contracting 
parties have the freedom to make business judgment decisions. 
105. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
106. See Kessler & Fine, supra note 6, at 412. "What may still seem to be a phase of 
preliminary negotiations to one of the parties may be regarded by the law as a binding 
commitment in the interest of fair dealing." 
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Furthermore, they may discontinue negotiations or breach their 
contract and be subject only to contract remedies. 
Standard's conduct may have arisen from permissible busi-
ness decisions or strategies. It was attempting to counter the ef-
fects of the government allocation mandate on its operations. As 
it instituted its "no new business policy," other oil suppliers 
probably also initiated stringent measures to compensate for the 
oil shortage. Thus, Standard may have viewed the oil embargo 
as presenting a propitious opportunity to make a profit. By ag-
gressively pursuing its existing customers and aggressively di-
vesting itself from its nonprofitable ventures, it may have seen 
greater opportunity to build a more productive customer base, a 
likely concern of any business entity. 
A business strategy to balance conflicting interests may 
have resulted, under the circumstances, in Standard's decision 
that it was economically sound to breach its contract. If, after 
Seaman's, Standard and others will be deterred from doing so 
out of concern there will be exposure to tort liability and puni-
tive damages, Seaman's result is an encroachment on commer-
cial parties' autonomy to freely contract in business transac-
tions. Legal scholars have cautioned against "any 
overenthusiastic and indiscriminate embracing of good faith no-
tions .... Judicial intervention in the name of fairness must 
find its limit when it impinges too greatly on private auton-
omy."107 The predictable effect of this is to curtail economic 
freedom since parties may now be compelled to remain in un-
profitable transactions to their detriment and be unwilling to 
take part in speculative ventures because the option to breach is 
no longer a viable economic alternative. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The decision in the Seaman's case strongly suggests that 
parties to commercial contracts must take exemplary precau-
tions during their negotiations to avoid the risk of having to de-
fend against tort damages. It essentially places constraints on 
contracting parties who previously had self-governing authority 
to make their own enforceable contracts. Contract law has 
107. [d. at 449. 
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evolved to facilitate commercial transactions and to promote ec-
onomic exchange. Should the decision of Seaman's find ready 
acceptance, parties to commercial contracts will be forced to sur-
mount precipitous grades whenever this new "stonewall tort" is 
implicated. 
Alisa J. Kim* 
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